Educational subsidies are frequently justified as a method of altering the income distribution. It is thus natural to compare education to other tax-transfer schemes designed to achieve distributional objectives. While equity-efficiency trade-offs are frequently discussed, they are rarely explicitly treated. This paper creates a general equilibrium model of school attendance, labor supply, wage determination, and aggregate production, which is used to compare alternative redistribution devices in terms of both deadweight loss and distributional outcomes. A wage subidy generally dominates tuition subsidies in ex ante (or "opportunity") calculations, but this reverses in ex post (or "realized") calculations. Both are generally superior to a negative income tax. With externalities in production, however, there is an unambiguous role for governmental subsidy of education, because it both raises GDP and creates a more equal income distribution.
Introduction
Education occupies a central position in the policies of governments around the world and is almost always heavily subsidized. The underlying justi cation for governmental involvement takes a variety of forms, but increasingly it is suggested that expanded educational investments both strengthen the national economy and improve the societal distribution of income and welfare. Education, for example, had a prominent role in the United State's \War on Poverty," begun in the 1960s and the programs begun then continue through today. And the expansion of public colleges and universities over the past three decades has rested on distributional underpinnings. This paper takes seriously the potential for education to play a role in redistribution, and in that vein considers how well education compares to alternative approaches to redistribution. The ultimate objective is to compare alternative programs in terms of both aggregate output e ects and redistributive e ects.
By pointing to the high economic returns to additional education, many peoplereadily accept a signi cant governmental role in the production and nancing of education. But of course the appropriateness, or even bene cial in uence, of governmental involvement requires more than merely nding high private and social returns to schooling. As a general rule, an active role for government is justi ed either by some market imperfection or by an alternative objective of government, such as redistributional motives, that extends past simple maximization of aggregate output.
Appeals to externalities such as improving the functioning of democratic government or reducing crime have provided traditional support for government's ensuring free and universal elementary and secondary schools. But such arguments are less convincing when considering governmental investments in higher education. It is di cult to imagine that marginal externalities of this sort are large, or anywhere near the 40 percent of higher education revenues that come from governmental appropriations (National Center for Education Statistics, 2000). 1 Instead of relying on externality arguments, providing subsidies to higher education, especially through free or reduced tuition programs at public colleges and universities, is more frequently 1 An alternative externality argument could also follow from growth e ects as highlighted by endogenous growth models. To address these issues, our subsequent analysis considers such production externalities { although this situation clearly stacks the case in favor of educational subsidies because of the potential e ciency gains. justi ed either on distributional grounds or on capital market imperfections and the inability to borrow against human capital (e.g., Becker 1993 Becker 1964 or Garratt and Marshall 1994) . Access to higher education is seen as a way of improving the distribution of income { particularly as related to parental income, race, or socio-economic status. Once put into a distributional context, however, it is natural to compare educational subsidies with alternative w ays of distributing income. 2 Education may h a ve unique features, since human capital investments have productive v alue, but the governmental interventions involving taxes to support governmental provision of higher education and price modi cations through tuition reductions are still distortionary. Therefore, it is plausible that other redistributional tools could have lower e ciency costs.
Since the act of redistributing resources and income typically will introduce distortions into the economy, no consideration of the redistributive impact of a governmental program is complete without understanding any e ciency costs related to the program. For the most part, analyses of governmental transfer programs are partial equilibrium analyses that assume little aggregate distortion and thus concentrate largely on the impact to the recipients. 3 Throughout the world, however, educational subsidies and other transfer programs are large (Smeeding et al., 1993 ) and could have a noticeable impact on output and wages in the economy. This paper focuses on just the interaction of aggregate output and distributional outcomes.
The simple general equilibrium model of the economy developed here combines both tax and transfer programs and permits a full comparison of alternative transfer mechanisms. In the basic model, the only role of government is the redistribution of income. It accomplishes this task by raising funds with a (distortionary) linear income tax. It then redistributes income through three canonical transfer programs: lump sum redistribution, a wage subsidy, or a tuition subsidy to schooling. (When lump sum spending is combined with the income tax, this transfer device becomes 2 An earlier formulation of this problem can be found in Layard (1979 Layard ( , 1981 . 3 There are a few exceptions, although each focuses on di erent aspects of the economy t h a n w e do. Fair (1971) considers a model of the economy w h i c h incorporates the optimal distribution of income into the analysis. Thurow (1971) also highlights individual preferences over the distribution of income. Bishop (1979) compares alternative transfer programs in an aggregate, general equilibrium model. Gramlich a n d W olko (1979) provide a methodology for assessing the utility gains from transfers but do not consider any general equilibrium impacts. And, Browning (1993) investigates how e ciency losses enter into the calculation of the costs of governmental redistribution. a negative income tax program). Individuals make both schooling and labor supply decisions.
Schooling has productive value, but no externalities are initially considered. In many ways, the education subsidies considered here look like the provision of higher education in the United States { w h e r e tuition is heavily subsidized and where there are few supply constraints.
A central methodological consideration is treatment of the trade-o between equity and eciency. While policy discussions frequently suggest considerations of such a trade-o , it is di cult to nd examples of analyses that deal explicitly with both equity and e ciency. Most analyses of public transfer programs discuss only the redistribution without mention of any e ciency losses, while other analyses of public programs with explicit outcome objectives discuss e ciency, or costbene t considerations, without any integrated treatment of distributional consequences. The one exception to this dichotomy is abstract analyses of maximizing social welfare functions that can include distributional arguments. But it is generally true that di erent social welfare functions { that meet standard preference axioms but that allow very di erent weights for e ciency and equity interests { provide minimal guidance, since they can suggest very di erent optimal policies depending on the speci c functional form.
This analysis focuses directly on the equity-e ciency trade-o in a general equilibrium framework that makes e ciency issues central. Our approach describes in a v ery general way the locus of feasible results for each redistributional device in output-distribution space. If any device dominates the others in the sense of permitting greater equity for any given level of output, we know that it will be chosen with any social welfare function (that positively values both output and more equality). Of course, if such universal dominance is not found, choice of the optimal policy and redistributional device will revert to a dependence on the precise social welfare function that is applied.
In our analysis, the exact de nition of distributional aspects of the economy proves to bedecisive in identifying the optimal policy. Speci cally, there are two distinct ways of calculating the distributional outcomes of policies: in an ex ante or in an ex post sense. 4 The former, which is cal-culated before the outcomes of decisions are known, corresponds most closely to an \opportunity" standard, while the latter, which is calculated on outcomes observed after the results of decisions are realized, corresponds more closely to conventional distributional discussions based on current empirical information. In many w ays, a criterion based on the ex ante distribution of utility seems to match most distributional discussions best, but it does not permit the empirical veri cation that considerations of the ex post distribution does.
In our base case, a wage subsidy can obtain any feasible level of aggregate utility along with more equality in the ex ante distribution of utility than is possible with the alternative subsidy schemes. This result does not prove to be sensitive to the underlying distribution of abilities in the economy or to reasonably wide variation in the fundamental parameters of the economy. On the other hand, depending on the underlying distribution of abilities in the economy, education subsidies can dominate when distributional calculations are based on ex post outcomes or simply on income rather than utility. Further, with the introduction of production externalities, the use of education subsidies becomes an e cient approach o ver most levels of governmental intervention, but this result is not particularly surprising because of the e ciency value of counteracting the externality.
The Basic Model
The model focuses on the role of schooling and transfers in an economy where society cares about both aggregate consumption and the distribution of individual welfare. The basic structure revolves around a one-period general equilibrium model of a competitive economy. The government provides schools and operates transfer programs, all of which must be paid for by either tuition or proportional taxes on income which are su cient to balance the budget. Individuals make optimizing choices about school attendance and the labor-leisure trade-o based upon school costs and expected wages. The schooling decision involves uncertainty because individuals with di erent ability h a ve di erent c hances of successfully completing schooling. Because taxes can be raised only the analysis. through distortionary taxes, the e ects of alternative transfer policies on either the performance of the economy or the distribution of welfare are not obvious.
Agent Behavior
The model considers an economy with an uncountably in nite number of types of agents with di ering ability, a. Ability has no direct labor market payo but instead indicates`educational ability', the chance of succeeding in schooling completing school, however, does have a direct labor market payo . 5 For simplicity, the population of agents is normalized to unity and the index of ability, a is distributed on the interval 0 1] according to the density function f(a),
(More details on this will appear in later sections). An agent of type a faces the fully known probability P a = 1 ; a of being successful in school. (Note that higher a means a lower probability of success). Ex post there are only two skill levels of workers in the economy { educated workers who successfully completed school and uneducated workers who either did not attend school or did not successfully complete school. Each a g e n t c hooses at the beginning of his or her life whether to go to school or not, based on school tuition, t, and the expected wages from school attendance. In this oneperiod model, schooling is instantaneous, and there is no opportunity cost of attempting schooling, although there is the uncertainty of school completion. Agents also have perfect knowledge of the equilibrium wage structure: successfully completing school earns a w age of w is labor supply, and ( , > 0) are parameters related to the disutility of labor, i = e (educated) or u (uneducated), m is any lump-sum cash transfer from government, is the tax rate, t is the tuition fee, and I is an indicator function that takes on the value 1 if the agent attends school and 0 otherwise. 6 Since the utility function is semi-linear, it allows us to focus on the e ects of redistribution without the presence of any insurance incentives on the part of the agent. 7 The optimal labor supply choice of the individual, L i , is simply a function of the wage rate as:
Labor supply is increasing in wages, and backward bending behavior of the supply function is ruled out. With < 1, the labor supply function is convex with > 1, the labor supply function is concave. The marginal utility o f leisure is independent of the lump sum transfer m, that is, direct transfers do not a ect the supply of labor.
The schooling decision can be understood by comparing the expected utility obtained from enrolling in school with the utility from not attending school but instead entering the labor market.
Individuals attending school either successfully nish and become educated labor (e) or fail and are relegated to being uneducated labor (u), the same status as not attending school at all. 
Since there is a continuum of agents, the measure of the population who choose not to go to school will be 1 ; These are the key measures of the labor force. Given this basic structure, a rst-best approach would beto tax ability, a. Because ability is exogenously set for each individual, taxing it would not distort education or labor supply decisions. Thus, any redistribution could beaccomplished without the e ciency loss that accompanies the income tax considered here. At the same time, it is reasonable to presume that the social planner cannot observe an individual's true ability and therefore cannot use ability taxes.
Wage Determination
The economy has only two t ypes of workers in the economy: those who have successfully completed school and those who have not. In order to determine wages, it is assumed that all agents have access to an aggregate CES production function: 
Government Transfers and Budget
This model abstracts from how the composition of government expenditures is determined and ignores any r o l e o f g o vernment other than the redistribution of income and welfare. The government must maintain a balanced budget and is restricted to the use of a proportional income tax to raise revenues. The level and form of this budget is determined by the type of redistribution. Three redistribution schemes are considered: tuition subsidies for education, a negative income tax, and a w age subsidy. 8 As discussed below, N ew recognizes that educated workers are also needed to teach.
Education Subsidies
A signi cant portion of the discussion of higher education nance has concentrated on intergenerational equity and access. For example, Hansen and Weisbrod (1969) suggested that the implicit subsidies in the California public higher education system were skewed toward the wealthy McPherson and Schapiro (1991), in their broad evaluation of higher education nance, focus on how public tuition subsidies interact with parental incomes. We o n t h e other hand do not consider any intergenerational e ects but instead ask the more fundamental question, 'What are the redistributive e ects of education subsidies compared to no governmental intervention or to alternative redistributional programs?'
With education subsidies, the government taxes income at rate and o ers education at a subsidized tuition t which is set by policy to be less than the cost of education per student, g (determined below). Since the population in the economy is normalized to 1, the budget constraint facing the government simply equates total expenditure on schools to tuition and tax payments: 
where N r = R a 0 f(a)da is the equilibrium enrollment. For individual agents in this economy, the government p r o vides no cash transfers, so m = 0 but the tuition faced by a n ybody attending school is less than its production costs.
Negative Income Tax (NIT)
Reacting in part to the then-existent high marginal tax rates on welfare and transfers, Friedman (1962) and others have proposed transfers to the low income population through a negative income tax. With redistribution through a negative income tax (NIT), all individuals in society receive a lump sum transfer m which acts as the guaranteed income of an agent with no other income. Labor income is then taxed (or the transfer is reduced by some portion of labor income), but at a rate below 100 percent. This vision of fundamentally di erent transfer mechanisms than existing programs led, among other things, to a series of random-assignment experiments designed to evaluate programmatic e ects, although the clear focus was on changes in labor supply behavior (see Munnell 1986 ).
The combination of a linear income tax and lump-sum transfers m assumed here is a special case of the NIT. Again, with the normalization of the population to 1, the government budget Because of the special nature of this economy with just two di erent w age rates, the more educated cannot receive a net subsidy. In this case, education is not subsidized (i.e., g = t), which is equivalent to schools being provided privately.
Wage Subsidy
A nal alternative is direct subsidization of the wages of the uneducated. Wage subsidies have been advocated by economists because of the ability t o target them on identi ed populations. Various temporary and permanent forms of wage subsidies have been employed in the United States and in OECD countries, but their e ectiveness is not fully understood (see Katz 1998) . Much of the attention and discussion of currently available subsidies focuses on the employment e ects, but here we focus entirely on the income redistributions aspects.
In our implementation, a tax 
Note that the budget constraint facing the individual agents is also altered to re ect the di erent tax (subsidy) rates on income for the educated and uneducated workers. 
In addition, it must be true in equilibrium that educated agents earn more than uneducated agents, 
School Costs (g)
The social cost of education has beentreated as a xed material cost with no direct consideration of the opportunity cost of human capital employed by the education sector and unavailable for direct production. Clearly, however, the largest element o f the production cost of schools is skilled labor, making it appropriate to consider how school costs vary with the wage rates and demands for schooling that are central to this analysis.
The simplest approach to de ning school costs assumes that it takes b teaching hours to educate a student, whether he or she will graduate or not. Further, it is assumed that a teacher can only teach n b students simultaneously (i.e., that schooling is produced by a simple xed coe cient technology). Underlying this development is an implicit perspective that there is no choice over quality of schooling and that all educated workers are equally productive in teaching or in goods production. In equilibrium, all skilled workers must receive the same utility from teaching or from goods production. Thus, the teacher is only willing to work the same amount o f t i m e a s a n y skilled worker is willing to work L e and they also face the same tax rate as other educated workers:
For the model economy with a population equal to unity and with an equilibrium enrollment ratio of N e , the numberofteachers demanded is N t (N e b) = (n b L e ) which is the total teaching hours needed divided by t h e n umber of student classroom hours each teacher can provide. We consider only cases where N ew is positive. Since only workers directly contribute to goods production, the social cost of education (g) is measured by the working hours of the teachers times the wage rate of educated workers. 10 9 Notice this formulation implicitly assumes that the teachers themselves need to be students rst. This calculation is somewhat awkward in a static model but understandable if the static model is perceived as being a steady state of a dynamic economy. 10 The formulation with endogenous schooling costs yields some sharply di erent conclusions than a formulation w i t h x e d s c hooling costs. For example, with general productivity improvements, wages of all types of workers will increase proportionally. If the (social) cost of education is exogenous, the school enrollment ratio (a ) unambiguously increases, because the enrollment ratio will depend on the relative level of the exogenous cost of education to the level of productivity. However, if the social cost of education is endogenous, an increase in the skilled/educated worker's wage also increases the opportunity cost of being a teacher. In fact, under the particular formulation employed here, the level of productivity will have no e ect on the equilibrium enrollment ratio. With endogenous school costs, the model also generates the prediction that, as the working hours of skilled workers decrease, the teacher-student ratio will increase. This seems consistent with the historical experience internationally, although similar results could be generated by other models of schooling demand. Aggregate distributional issues are seldom explicitly considered, but there are several consistent ways to formulate the problem to incorporate such distribution. For example, if distributional elements enter each individual's utility function, distribution would automatically betaken care of when social utility is calculated as the aggregation of individual welfare. Alternatively, society's concerns about distributional issues could be introduced directly at the level of the social welfare function { by explicitly identifying weights on distributional outcomes. We follow a di erent approach. For each tax rate and distributional mechanism we trace out the feasible surface for combinations of aggregate outcomes and the distribution of welfare. This equity-e ciency locus then permits a social planner to maximize overall welfare by selecting both a transfer mechanism and a size of government. Even within this analytical framework, however, a variety of natural alternatives exist. Here we describe the computations for education subsidies or a negative income tax. The straightforward modi cation for the multiple tax rates in the wage subsidy case is not explicitly described but is easy to derive.
Aggregate Expected Utility (AEU)
We consider a social planner who maximizes the sum of the expect utility l e v els of all agents, S( t ). This simple utilitarian welfare function, which aggregates the utility of agents who are successful in school, who fail and become uneducated, and who do not go to school at all, is simply: In an economy with education subsidies, the planner maximizes this function subject to equations (1) and (2), while in the economy with a negative income tax (lump-sum cash transfers), the planner maximizes S( t ) subject to (1) and (3) since agents bearall the costs of education. In the case of wage subsidy, the planner maximizes social welfare subject to (5) and (4) 
Measurement of Inequality
The e ects of the redistribution schemes can be viewed in two separate ways { e x a n te and ex post { with resulting di erences in interpretation. The ex ante calculations can be directly interpreted as the degree of equality of opportunity faced by the population. The ex post calculation on the other hand indicates the degree of contemporaneous inequality and is, in a political economy sense, likely to be very relevant for policy decisions about redistribution. In our simpli ed economy, alternative ways of aggregating the utility distribution make little di erence, and therefore the Gini coe cient is selected as the summary measure. 12 Gini coe cients are computed based on income as well as utility. The virtue of calculations based on utility is that they capture the gains in leisure of the agents in the economy, and we emphasize these.
The computation with either after-tax income or utility levels is particularly straightforward in the ex post problem. There are three income classes in the economy. The highest wage earners are those who are successful in schooling with a net income of (1 ; that the Lorenz curve (relating the cumulative population distribution to the cumulative income distribution) has three linear segments whose length re ects the proportions of the population in each group. The Gini coe cient is easily calculated from the area between the Lorenz curve and 11 Note that at this point there is no need to distinguish between teachers and educated workers involved in production, since they must have the same utility. The weights in S re ect the total number of agents successfully completing school. 12 See Lambert (1990) and Cowell (2000) for more details.
the 45 degree line representing an equal income (or utility) distribution. The larger the area, the more inequality that exists, and the larger the value of the Gini coe cient.
The nature of the ex postdistribution also points out the conceptual superiority of the ex ante calculations. The people who try school but fail clearly have a higher expected utility at the time of the decision { otherwise they would not have attended school. While the realized outcome may di er, they are better o than those not attending in the sense that they have better opportunities. 13 The ex ante calculations, however, vary directly with ability level. For low ability people (who do not attempt further schooling), ex ante and ex post utility are the same. People with higher ability (who attempt schooling) will always have e x a n te at least as high as these low income people.
In fact, even among those who enroll in colleges, ex ante utility rises with ability as the probability of successfully completing schooling rises with ability. In the computations, the Lorenz curve for ex ante utility i s approximated through discretization.
Base Case Outcomes
The intuition behind the mechanics of the model is as follows: Wages between educated and uneducated workers are unequal due to a skill premium arising from successfully completing schooling.
Wages are determined by the marginal products derived from an aggregate production function.
Governments's only function is redistributing income, which is accomplished by rst raising revenues with a distortionary tax that directly a ects labor-leisure choices. The form of subsidy employed has direct implications for the amount of schooling attempted and completed and thus for wages in the economy. The feedback through distorted decisions has implications for both aggregate outcomes and the distribution of welfare.
Comparisons among the alternative policy regimes requires xing a numberof key parameters and underlying distributions. Unfortunately, the key parameters have not been estimated very precisely. We begin with a base case benchmarked to prevailing estimates of the central elasticity 13 Part of the di erence in ex post caculations comes from the fact that there is no labor market return to either ability or partial schooling. If either of these existed, it could close if not overcome the gap introduced by the "wasted" tuition payments.
parameters. Subsequent sections investigate the sensitivity of the results both to parameter choices and to more fundamental speci cation issues including the underlying ability distribution and the presence of growth externalities.
Fundamental parameter values
The decision of parameter values begins with the preference side. The key elements a ecting individual choice are the underlying elasticity of labor supply (1= ) and the elasticity of substitution between educated and uneducated labor ( = 1 =(1 ; )). Despite considerable empirical analysis employing bothexperimental and econometric approaches, a surprisingly wide range of estimates for labor supply elasticities exists (Pencavel 1986 Killingsworth and Heckman 1986 Blundell and Finally, in terms of key assumptions, we begin with a symmetric distribution of abilities (symmetric around 0:5). (The details can be found in the appendix). While it is common to nd estimates of IQ or other measures of ability to be normally distributed, we know of no analysis that addresses the functional form for scholastic ability { the ability to complete schooling { as used here. As with the other key parameters, however, we subsequently investigate the sensitivity o f t h e results to this distributional speci cation. 14 
Base results
With the balanced governmental budget, the tax rate simply indexes the size of each program. Table   1 s h o ws how the di erent subsidy schemes promote very di erent patterns of attendance in school.
With no taxes or transfers (i.e., the no government case), 41 percent of the population attends school and successfully completes, another 21 percent attends school but fail, and the remaining 38 percent never attends. Given the structure of the economy, all of the people attending school have higher ability than the most able person not attending school, but the failed and successful groups will each have people of overlapping ability. As the tax rate and subsidy increase, the programs have very di erent attendance patterns. 15 With greater education subsidies, the net tuition to the student falls, and a larger proportion of students attends school. The largest impact of this, however, is on the failure rate. While successful completers go from 41 percent of the population in the no subsidy case to 50 percent in the case of a 12 percent tax to support education, the proportion attending but failing school rises from 21 percent to 45 percent. This response re ects the high levels of tuition subsidy. At a 6 percent tax rate, tuition to students is only 45 percent of school costs at a 12 percent tax rate, tuition is just 10 percent of school costs. 16 The school attendance behavior is always individually optimal given the tuition costs and wage structure that results, but many more now fall into the lowest utility group (the failed students).
The pattern is very di erent for the two other subsidy schemes. For each, increasing levels of subsidy lead to lower school attendance and a smaller educated work force, with the declines that under the current formulation, the tuition-skilled worker wage ratio is related to the zero-tax teacher-student ratio, t=w e = g=w e = b=n b : We set b=n b equals to 0:05, which is close to the empirical calculation of t=w e . Lastly, w e set the productivity parameter A in the production function to be 0:4 so that the equilibrium enrollment ratio with zero tax and zero subsidy is about 60%. To see this, notice that in the symmetric distribution case, a = 1 ; (t=w e ) n ;1= (1 + ) ;1 (w e ) 1= h 1 ; (w e =w u ) (1+ )= io ;1 : It is clear that the ratios t=w e and w e =w u will be invariant to the productivity parameter A. Thus, the enrollment ratio a depends on the wage for skilled worker w e , which in turns depends on the productivity parameter. The cases for other distributions are similar. To our knowledge, there does not exist a reliable estimate for the scale parameter in the labor supply function, , although this is not a k ey parameter for our analysis. In the benchmark case, is set to 3 so that the working hours for both educated and uneducated workers are in between 30 to 40 percent of their total time endowment. 15 Our simulations have t a x rates for schooling going from 0 to 12 percent (the point where virtually everybody attends). The upper bound is obviously far beyond current expenditures on college. 16 The cost of schooling does decline slightly with higher subsidies for tuition because the wages of educated workers and thus teachers are driven down, making schooling cheaper given the linear cost function. But the cost decline is not signi cant for the results. The distortions in the economy introduced by the taxes and subsidies have direct implications for wage distributions in the economy. Table 2 shows the relative w ages of educated to uneducated workers. In the competitive economy with no government ( = 0), educated workers have gross wage rates the are forty-two percent a b o ve those of uneducated workers. Education subsidies induce more people to go to school, and the increased proportion of educated workers squeezes their relative wages. T h e o t h e r t wo subsidy schemes, however, work in just the opposite direction, with the most dramatic impact coming for the wage subsidy where the relative earnings of the educated grow to 1:75 with a 12 percent tax rate.
These outcomes, nonetheless, do not show the complete picture of the e ects on the economy. First, they neglect any consideration of how the distortions in uence aggregate production and welfare. Second, they must be combined with the transfer programs in order to understand the full impact on individual welfare, since the pre-tax wages and outcomes ignore the direct transfers.
Third, at any tax rate, the di erent subsidy schemes introduce di erent amounts of distortion into the economy, implying that better comparisons would involve subsidy schemes at levels of equal aggregate distortion. The competitive economy with a zero tax rate yields the largest aggregate utility, and increases in the tax rate decrease aggregate utility i n e a c h of the subsidy schemes. But, with higher taxes more redistribution occurs, and the distribution of utility becomes more equal (as seen by increasing values of 1-Gini). Thus, if society values both aggregate output and more equality, movement up and to the right represents improvement i n o verall societal welfare. Figure 1 , providing the locus of feasible aggregate output (in utility terms) and opportunity distributions under each scheme, indicates that a wage subsidy is a superior subsidy scheme to education tuition subsidies, which in turn are superior to negative income tax. Under any social welfare function, the wage subsidy can provide higher welfare, because it can achieve any feasible level of aggregate expected utility w i t h more equality than either of other two subsidy schemes.
As noted, however, other measures of equity are possible, and Figure 2 
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Edu Subsidy NIT Wage subsidy obtaining higher wages. In an ex post sense, however, this is not the case because all failures begin with higher ability t h a n the group that did not attempt schooling. Thus, not only does the amount of redistribution change but the character of the subsidies also changes. We return to a more detailed comparison of the distributional aspects in the next section.
The gures vividly illustrate one additional important feature: the tax rate is a very imperfect index of the impact of governmental interventions. Importantly, the varying distributional schemes have very di erent distortionary e ects at any given tax rate, so the typical practice of comparing the redistribution from alternative transfer mechanisms by choosing a common tax rate will yield very misleading comparisons. At a 12 percent tax rate, the economy employing a negative income tax loses only 0:3 percent of aggregate expected utility, compared to losses of 0:8 percent for the wage subsidy, and 3:2 percent for the education subsidy. Put the other way, an education subsidy program with a 3 percent tax rate, a wage subsidy program with a 6 percent tax rate, and an NIT program with a 10 percent tax rate each has an equivalent deadweight loss (but they will have v ery di erent implications on inequality). The combined general equilibrium e ects of tax and subsidy programs illustrate the importance of programmatic detail in determining the welfare implications of governmental interventions, although most conventional program analyses miss this.
Ex ante v. ex post
By focusing on why wage subsidies and education tuition subsidies change place in the orderings, it is possible to understand better how these subsidies work. The results here may seem counterintuitive a t r s t sight. It is often asserted that education subsidy will improve the \equalization of opportunities" and thus would seem to bea goodpolicy from the ex ante point of view. On the other side, a wage subsidy seems to target on those who have not attended or could not nish the college and thus would bea goodpolicy from the ex post point of view. The results in this paper reverse these assertions and therefore deserve more discussion. While the stated assertions contain some truth, they miss a general equilibrium perspective and a framework for \fair" comparison across regimes. For instance, while an education subsidy indeed induces more agents to receive college education (Table 1) , it also change the composition of the labor force and hence changes the relative wage ratio (Table 2 ). In addition, the marginal failure rate increases as the subsidy rate increases, so that the expected impact for each tax dollar will decrease as the scale of education subsidies is enlarged and the e ciency of the system thus decreases. Thus, while an education subsidy might be able to generate a higher level of equality, the adverse e ect on the e ciency cannot beignored.
The full comparison, however, of the di erences between the ex ante and ex post results requires going behind the summary outcomes depicted in Figures 1 and 2 . Each point on the outcome loci of each regime represents a full underlying distribution of utilities, and it is instructive to compare the underlying distribution across the wage subsidy and tuition subsidy regimes. (Because the negative income tax is always dominated, we drop consideration of it in these comparisons). Our criteria of \dominance of regimes" is that, at a given level of e ciency, a higher level of equality can bereached. And, since as noted di erent regimes carry di erent implications to the distribution of utility even at the same tax rate, a natural candidate is to compare a point on one regime's loci to another point on the other regime's loci with both higher e ciency (as measured by AEU) and higher equality (as measured by 1-Gini).
To illustrate, we compare the distribution of ex ante utility of four percent tax rate under the education subsidy regime with the ve percent tax rate under the wage subsidy in the benchmark case. The latter achieves both higher level of e ciency and equality than the former. Figure 3 displays the distribution of ex ante utilities and the corresponding density of agents. Expected ex ante utility of individual agents increases along the horizontal axis while the height of the curves indicates the density of agents at each utility level. 17 The shape of the two distributions is similar.
In fact, for people receiving the middle range of utility ( b e t ween 0:05 and 0:06), the density of agents under the two regimes is similar. The distinctive di erence appears at the ends of the distribution.
The bottom group under bothregimes is comprised of low ability individuals for whom attending school is not optimal. This population expects to receive a direct subsidy under the wage subsidy 
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regime, whereas it expects only indirect e ects (through relative w age improvement) under tuition subsidies, i.e., the lowest ability peoplesee none of the tuition subsidy since they do not attempt further schooling. Interestingly, the top ability group also achieves a higher level of utility under the wage regime than under the education subsidy regime. Because the group of agents who successfully complete schooling is relatively small under the wage subsidy regime, the relative w age e ects more than compensate for the higher tuitions (compared to the education subsidy case). Summing up these illustrative comparisons, the expected utility improvements to the lowest ability people under the wage subsidy are the dominant force leading to compression of the ex ante distribution of utility (for an overall level of aggregate utility).
Now consider the ex post case. We compare the distribution of ex post utility of a three percent tax rate under the education subsidy regime with the six percent tax rate under the wage subsidy regime. The former achieves both higher e ciency and higher ex post equality than the former. Table 1 ).
In sum, the wage subsidy scheme has its most concentrated impact on those who face the worst opportunities { those with low ability for whom there is not su cient expectation of gaining from further schooling. It proves superior in equalizing ex ante utilities (for any given level of governmentally induced ine ciency). The tuition subsidy proves better after schooling outcomes are realized, because it subsidizes school failures and brings up their ex post utility (even though these people have higher ability and higher ex ante utility than individuals who do not attempt schooling). In other words, behind the observed opportunity loci for the di erent subsidy schemes 
Sensitivity Analysis
As mentioned, the key parameters for our simpli ed economy have not beenestimated with much precision. We therefore consider the e ects of di erent subsidies assuming di erent labor elasticities, 18 The bold elements of the tables corresponds to the base case described above.
The most important aspect of these sensitivity analyses is that the prior results are not a ected much by considering a broad range of parameters for the economy. When eva l u a t e d o n a n e x a n te basis, the wage subsidy regime proves superior. On an ex postbasis, however, we nd ambiguity about whether tuition subsidies are superior.
The distribution of abilities clearly in uences the ex post results. The tuition subsidies have their strongest in uence when abilities follow a symmetric distribution that peaks in the middle.
Since the cuto enrollment rate in the no tax case is reasonably close to the center of the distribution (62 percent), changes in incentives for school attendance have large e ects on the population induced to continue schooling. With the uniform and skewed distributions, the impact on enrollment is less, and tuition subsidies cannot have the same in uence on the distribution of outcomes. In fact, negative income taxes are uniformly ranked at the bottom except when the ability distribution is skewed toward low ability, at which point they tend to dominate tuition subsidies in an ex ante sense. Additionally, not surprisingly, tuition subsidies look better when there are lower elasticities of substitution and thus when the relative importance of education increases. Nonetheless, the overall conclusions are remarkably insensitive to the speci c parameters used.
Production Externalities of Education
A strong motivation for educational investments by society has traditionally been the presumption that there are signi cant externalities associated with education. The usual arguments about externalities, however, apply best to elementary and secondary education and less well to higher education (Hanushek 1996 Poterba 1996 ). This view is also supported by Acemoglu and Angrist (1999) . The one exception is consideration of how human capital might a ect national growth rates { through, say, the development of ideas or the di usion of technologies. In such a case, while competitive labor markets might exist, they will not be Pareto optimal, and government action might becalled for on pure e ciency grounds. Here we consider such a case in a simple extension of the basic model similar to that of Romer (1986) . This particular form is not only simple but also incorporates an externality that is compatible with perfectly competitive markets.
While all other aspects of our model of the economy remain the same, we now assume that all agents have access to an aggregate production function which of the CES form:
where E e is the \average e ective units of educated labor", the externality part, and ( > 0) is a parameter indexing the strength of the externality. Since individuals take the E e part as given, this economy is compatible with perfectly competitive markets but individual schooling decisions will tend to yield less than optimal education in the economy. The presence of the production externality c hanges the situation, because a subsidy to education now acts like a Pigouvian tax that enhances aggregate performance of the economy. At low levels of taxes and education subsidies, both aggregate expected utility and equality (1-Gini) improve,
Ability
Elasticity of Substitution for Education Distribution = 0:8 = 1:0 = 1:3 = 2:0 E E E Table 5 : Education Tax Rate above which W age Subsidies Dominate Education Subsidies based on Ex Ante Utility Calculations (E implies education subsidies always dominate) making education subsidies the clearly superior transfer mechanism. At higher levels of education subsidies, however, the ine ciency from tax distortions sometimes overcomes the e ciency gains from correcting the externality. The typical situation can be readily seen from considering the base case employed previously with the addition of the externality where = :1. 
Conclusions
This paper develops a methodology for evaluating transfer mechanisms that might be expected to have both output and distributional e ects. The speci c focus is the potential redistributive aspects of education tuition subsidies and how they compare with those of cash transfers through either a negative income tax or a wage subsidy to low w age workers. The comparisons incorporate both deadweight losses and redistribution within a one-period general equilibrium model of the economy. Workers di er by ability, where ability indexes the probability of successfully completing schooling. Individuals decide whether or not to pursue more schooling, and, based on the outcomes of that, choose labor supply levels. The government's only role is redistributing income. It provides transfers to individuals that are nanced by a (distorting) linear income tax, and it must maintain a balanced budget.
The overall results of the comparison of transfer mechanisms are very illuminating. In the simple world considered here, if where there were no interest in distributional outcomes, the social optimum would be no governmental taxation or spending. With no externalities, individual schooling and labor supply choices will lead to maximum social welfare, de ned by aggregate expected utility f o r individuals. With distributional motives which are supported by levying a distortionary income tax, however, the consideration of best governmental programs becomes more interesting.
Without externalities, the results are somewhat ambiguous. For our base case that relies on the best estimates of key parameters, wage subsidies dominate the alternative transfer mechanisms in the sense that any level of aggregate expected utility achieved by a negative income tax or an education subsidy can beachieved by a program of wage subsidies that also ensures more ex ante utility. This result breaks down, however, when utility is calculated on an ex post basis. With this metric, alternative descriptions of the production relationships, behavioral parameters, and ability distribution can yield superiority of tuition subsidies.
If there are production externalities related to the aggregate education level in the economy, however, the education subsidies serve a dual purpose { redistributing income while potentially moving the economy toward Pareto superior outcomes. Thus, a rationalization for the heavy subsidies for higher education can be generally derived when externalities are involved. While the bene cial e ects of education subsidies on aggregate output are not surprising when externalities of the growth variety are considered, educational subsidies also dominate in terms of the distribution of income and utility.
In order to focus on the key comparisons among alternative governmental transfer programs, this paper does not consider a series of issues that might also beimportant in evaluating govern- The sum of the integral of the piecewise continuous function gives the area underneath the Lorenz curve. The Gini coe cient is simply 1;(2 area under Lorenz curve).
